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When prompted, preschoolers advocate punishment for moral transgressions against third
parties, but little is known about whether and how they might act out such punishment. In
this study, adult demonstrators enacted doll stories in which a perpetrator child doll made
an unprovoked attack on a victim child doll, after which an adult doll punished either the
perpetrator (consistent punishment) or victim (inconsistent punishment). When asked to
help retell the story, given free choice of their own preferred actions for the adult doll,
4-year-olds (N =32) were influenced by the demonstrated choice of target when selecting
a target for punishment or admonishment.This influence was weak following inconsistent
punishment, however, because the participants tended to change the story by punishing
or admonishing the perpetrator when the demonstrator had punished the victim. Four-
year-olds’ tendency to select a moral rule violator as a target for punishment is therefore
stronger than their tendency to copy the specific actions of adults, which itself is known
to be very strong. The evidence suggests that 4-year-olds’ enactment of punishment is at
least partially based on a belief that antisocial actions deserve to be punished.
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INTRODUCTION
This study is an investigation of third-party punishment in
preschool children. Third-party punishment refers to actions that
inflict harm against an individual and that are motivated by that
individual’s violation of social norms. Third-party punishment
distinguishes itself from direct punishment in that third-party-
punishment follows a norm violation that did not directly affect
the punisher (Jensen, 2010). Direct punishment is known to occur
in children (Robbins and Rochat, 2011) and non-human animals
(Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1995) and is relatively straightforward
to explain in functional and mechanistic terms, whereas third-
party punishment is more challenging to explain and has so far
only been identified in humans (Jensen, 2010). Third-party pun-
ishment (henceforth punishment) has a profound impact in that
it enables the establishment of large scale cooperative networks
by discouraging violations of cooperation norms (Boyd and Rich-
erson, 1992; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Nowak and Sigmund,
2005). The profound impact of punishment on society is also felt
through the effects of modern criminal justice systems, which have
been argued to be not entirely positive for society (Rubin, 2004;
Useem and Piehl, 2008; The Economist, 2010).
It has been suggested on the basis of experiments (Price et al.,
2002) and evolutionary models (Boyd and Richerson,1992; Nowak
and Sigmund, 2005; Gintis et al., 2008) that punitive sentiment
may be an inherited specialized mechanism that evolved because
individuals benefit from the cooperation that it enables (Robinson
et al., 2007). Related to this is the finding that participants in exper-
imental studies of attitudes toward punishment give justifications
for punishment that are incompatible with the punishment judg-
ments they actually advocate. Deterrence is frequently proposed as
a justification for punishment, even though the majority are in fact
motivated by a retributive sentiment that norm violations deserve
punishment (Carlsmith and Darley, 2008; Keller et al., 2010).
According to the evolutionary view, deterrence may be advo-
cated because of rationalization, whereas retribution is practiced
because that is how the evolved system works.
The profound impact of punishment on society and the sug-
gestion that it may be an inherited trait mean that developmen-
tal studies of young children’s tendency to punish are essential.
Despite this, the matter is almost completely unstudied. We are
aware of only one published study in which young children have
had the opportunity to inflict harm on those who harmed third
parties (Hamlin et al., 2011; though see also Riedl et al., 2011).
Hamlin et al. (2011) asked children in their second year (mean
age 20 months) to give a treat to a puppet. The only source of
treats were two other puppets who had already been given one
treat each, one of whom had previous behaved antisocially and
one of whom had behaved prosocially, and the participants were
instructed to choose which puppet to take a treat from. They
tended to take a treat from the antisocial puppet. Further, Hamlin
et al. (2011) found that although infants normally avoid individ-
uals who have behaved antisocially (Hamlin et al., 2007; Hamlin
and Wynn, 2011), 8-month-olds actually preferred a puppet who
had hindered rather than helped another puppet that had itself
previously behaved antisocially. These results indicate that from
very early in development, when forced to choose, children have a
preference for causing harm to antisocial individuals and a prefer-
ence for individuals that do likewise. These preferences appear to
represent the developmental origins of the punitive sentiment.
Although there is a shortage of studies directly examining
young children’s tendency to punish, there are many studies that
have examined young children’s attitudes to social norm viola-
tions expressed in other ways (Smetana, 2006; Killen and Rutland,
2011). Children can verbally identify such violations by the age of
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three (Darley and Shultz, 1990; Catron and Masters, 1993; Tisak,
1993; Ingram and Bering, 2010). From this age children are also
sensitive to the intention behind an action, separate from the out-
come (Nelson, 1980; Zelazo et al., 1996; Nunez and Harris, 1998),
and can also distinguish between violations of convention and
morality (Smetana and Braeges, 1990; Stern and Peterson, 1999).
Preschoolers’ behavior toward moral norm violators is altered
appropriately – 3-year-olds avoid helping antisocial individuals
(Vaish et al., 2010) and attempt to prevent antisocial acts (Vaish
et al., 2011; Schmidt et al., 2012), and 4-year-olds prefer to allocate
resources to prosocial rather than antisocial individuals (Kenward
and Dahl, 2011). Gaze direction studies reveal that 3-month-olds
are sensitive to distinctions between helping and hindering behav-
ior (Hamlin et al., 2010). From the age of three children tend to
answer yes when asked if norm violators should “get into trou-
ble,” with moral norm violations regarded as more deserving of
punishment that other social rules (Smetana, 1981, 2006; Smetana
et al., 1993; Stern and Peterson, 1999).
To our knowledge, however, there are no published studies
of young children’s attitudes toward norm violations in which
children verbally administer a punishment, rather than advo-
cating it in response to leading questions. Given the difference
between study participants’ real and hypothetical moral behavior
(FeldmanHall et al., 2012), and given that real punishment is a
hostile and therefore risky act, a study in which young children
were given the impression they had an opportunity to allocate
real punishment would have the potential to greatly advance our
understanding. That no such study has to our knowledge been
published is striking given the above-mentioned reasons for the
importance of understanding the development of punishment.
The current authors submitted designs for two such studies to the
Uppsala regional ethical review board, both of which were rejected.
The current study was designed to give preschoolers the oppor-
tunity to directly inflict verbally administered punishment. We
used the technique of allowing children to guide the behavior
of dolls because this was accepted by the Uppsala regional ethi-
cal review board, and because doll stories are a useful and valid
alternative to observing real interaction in developmental research
(Murray, 2007). Verbal punishment expression was investigated
(in contrast to Hamlin et al., 2011) in order to be more revealing
concerning children’s conceptual understanding of punishment.
The primary hypothesis tested was that 4-year-olds target anti-
social individuals when enacting punishment. The method used
was to demonstrate stories involving verbal punishment of doll
children by an adult doll following a violent attack by one of
the children on the other, and then to engage the participant
in retelling the story, encouraging them to change the story if
they wanted. There were two within-subject conditions, one in
which the adult doll punished the perpetrator of the attack (con-
sistent punishment), and one in which the adult doll punished
the victim of the attack (inconsistent punishment). The primary
hypothesis predicts that participants will change the story in the
inconsistent punishment condition so that the perpetrator rather
than the victim is punished (see Welch-Ross and Schmidt, 1996
for an analogous method used to investigate the development of
gender-stereotyping). Because children are such prodigious imi-
tators, however, even of apparently inexplicable actions (Bandura
et al., 1961; Horner and Whiten, 2005; Nielsen and Blank, 2011;
Kenward, 2012; Over and Carpenter, 2012), it was also predicted
that the demonstrated choice of punishment target would influ-
ence the participants’ actions. The demonstrated punishment was
a withdrawal of privileges (sweets and TV). This punishment type
was selected because it is not unusual in Sweden (Palmérus, 1999).
We also examined the participants’ attitudes to punishment by
testing a secondary hypothesis that they would identify with and
therefore want to play the role of a punisher, but only when the
punishment was consistent. The idea behind this test was to be
able to examine an actively and spontaneously expressed attitude
toward punishment without explicit adult prompting or the need
for participants to actually enact any punishment. After each story
was demonstrated, children were asked to choose a doll to take
the roll of in the retelling, selecting between the adult doll who
had enacted the punishment and another adult doll who was sim-
ilar except had not enacted any punishment. The hypothesis that
4-year-olds approve of punishment of antisocial individuals and
therefore identify with those carrying out such punishment pre-
dicts that participants would choose to be the adult doll who had
punished, but only when the punishment had been consistent. We
also conducted an exploratory analysis of the effects of partici-
pants’ doll choice on their subsequent actions when retelling the
story.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were a self-selected sample who responded to an
invitation letter sent to all families with children of appropri-
ate age living in Uppsala, a medium-size Swedish city; therefore,
participants were mostly ethnically Swedish and had mixed socioe-
conomic backgrounds. Included in the final sample were 32 4-
year-olds (mean age 4 years and 1 month, SD= 1 month, 17 girls).
Six additional participants were tested but excluded from the final
analysis, four because of refusal to participate, one because of
parental interference, and one because of experimenter error. One
trial was excluded for each of three included participants due to
experimenter error affecting only that trial.
MATERIALS
The procedure took place at a low table at which the participant
sat on a chair, flanked by two experimenters sitting on the floor. A
different set of four wooden dolls (two adults and two children),
anatomically realistic and with clothes and hair, was used for each
of four scenarios (Figure 1). In each scenario, each experimenter
controlled one child doll and one adult doll (the same experi-
menter always had the same dolls in each scenario). Doll children
were given normal Swedish names and their genders alternated
from one scenario to the next, with boys used for the first sce-
nario. The doll adults were nameless but in appearance matched
the gender of the child dolls in their scenario.
DESIGN
Each participant took part in four trials, with each trial involving
a different demonstrated story scenario, all of which followed the
same pattern of one child doll attacking another, after which one
child doll was punished by an adult doll. One experimenter always
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FIGURE 1 | Still from video recording of procedure. Depicted is the
moment during story retelling when one child doll has attacked the other,
just before the participant is invited to select actions for the adult doll.
enacted the punishment with their adult doll and the other exper-
imenter (known as the questioner) put questions to the child.
The experimenter who enacted the attack with their child doll
was varied over the four trials as AABB or BBAA. There were two
trials for each participant for each of the two trial types (giving
a within-subjects design): inconsistent punishment, in which the
adult doll punished the victim child doll in the story demonstra-
tion, and consistent punishment, in which the adult doll punished
the perpetrator child doll in the story demonstration. The order
of inconsistent and consistent trials was varied as ABAB, BABA,
ABBA, or BAAB, counterbalanced against the previous variable.
The four different story scenarios (see Appendix) were always told
in the same order.
PROCEDURE
The procedure was approved by the Uppsala Regional Ethics Com-
mittee. After welcoming the child and the parent to the study room,
the two experimenters engaged the child in informal play intended
to familiarize the child with the situation. They then explained the
procedure to the parent and the child, and the parent signed an
informed consent form. The four trials proceeded immediately
one after another and lasted approximately 10 min in total.
Each trial began with a demonstration phase in which the
experimenters told a scripted story (see Appendix) with the dolls.
The child dolls were taken out and began by playing peace-
fully (football, hide-and-seek, rolling on the ground, and hand-
standing, in the four scenarios in respective order of presenta-
tion), after which one of them, without provocation, insulted and
attacked the other (by hitting, hitting, stamping on, and kicking,
respectively). All aspects of the dolls’ actions in the demonstra-
tion were verbally narrated and acted out by the experimenters.
For example, in the first scenario, the attack was depicted by an
experimenter saying “Then [child doll’s name] said: you’re stupid,
I’m going to hit you” and using the perpetrator child doll to knock
over the victim child doll. After the attack, the two adult dolls
were brought out and were declared to have seen everything that
had happened. One adult doll (the non-punishing adult doll) was
declared to do nothing. The other adult doll (the punisher adult
doll), targeting the victim (inconsistent trials) or perpetrator (con-
sistent trials) said “Why are you fighting, [child doll’s name]? Now
you won’t get any sweeties. And you won’t get to watch TV either.”
The punished doll did not react.
At this point, the choice phase was begun by the questioner
saying “And that was the end of the story. [Participant’s name], if
you got to be one of the grown-ups, which one would you be?”
while pointing at both adult dolls simultaneously. The question
was repeated after 10 s if necessary, and if after a further 10 s the
participant had still not selected one of the adult dolls, they were
handed the non-punishing doll. The non-chosen adult doll was
removed.
At this point, the questioner began the retelling phase by saying
“Now we are going to tell the story again, and [the other experi-
menter’s name] and I will be the children again, but [participant’s
name], now you get to be the grown-up and decide what the
grown-up does. It could be the same as before, or it could be
something new. You decide.” The experimenters then performed
the demonstration again, in a condensed form, stopping at the
point at which the adults had previously intervened, at which
point the questioner asked “what does the grown-up do now?”
The question was repeated after 7 s if the participant did noth-
ing. If the participant had still not caused the adult doll to take
a clear action after an additional 7 s, the questioner asked “Does
he/she do anything? Does he/she say anything”? If the participant
still did nothing, the trial was over. If the participant did take any
actions with the adult doll, the trial was over when the actions were
completed. During the choice and retelling phases, both experi-
menters looked only at the participant, to avoid cuing actions with
their gaze.
CODING AND ANALYSIS
All participants were coded from recordings by one of the experi-
menters and by a coder blind to the hypotheses of the study. The
blind coder’s data was used in all analyses. Participants’ choices of
adult doll were coded as being for the punisher, the non-punisher,
or neither (Cohen’s κ= 1.0). Participants’ actions with the adult
doll during story retelling were coded into the categories described
in Table 1, with punishment actions also classified into subtypes
(κ= 0.85). Actions sequences could contain actions classed in
more than one category. Each action was also coded as target-
ing the victim, the perpetrator, or neither (κ= 0.94). Parametric
model fit was checked by inspecting diagnostic scatterplots, using
standardized residuals (Grafen and Hails, 2002).
RESULTS
When participants caused the adult doll to punish or admon-
ish, the trends in both conditions were for them to target the
perpetrator more frequently than the victim (Table 2, Figure 2).
This was confirmed by a 2 (condition: consistent vs. inconsistent
demonstrated punishment)× 2 (participant target choice: perpe-
trator vs. victim) mixed-design ANOVA modeling the proportion
of trials in which participants punished, which revealed a sig-
nificant effect of participant target choice only, F(1, 93)= 12.77,
p= 0.001, η2= 0.08. The exact same pattern held when admon-
ishment rather than punishment was modeled, target choice F(1,
93)= 6.30, p= 0.014, η2= 0.04.
www.frontiersin.org October 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 373 | 3
Kenward and Östh Punishment by 4-year-olds
This does not, however, reflect a total lack of effect of demon-
strated punishment target. Seven of 32 participants punished
the victim at least once following an inconsistent punishment
demonstration, but none did so following a consistent punish-
ment demonstration, p= 0.016, sign test (Table 2, Figure 2).
It also follows that participants were more likely to change the
Table 1 | Coding category definitions.
Category Observed actions
Unclear or irrelevant Not interpretable (e.g., positioning the adult doll in
front of a child doll with an unclear or absent
verbalization) or irrelevant (e.g., declaring that the
adult was picking flowers).
Prosocial Causing a direct positive outcome for the target
(e.g., declaring that the adult was comforting the
child doll).
Admonishment Reprimanding rather than punishing (e.g., a
verbalization on the adult doll’s behalf commanding
the child doll to apologize).
Punishment Assignation of a negative outcome going beyond a
verbal reprimand.
PUNISHMENT SUBTYPES
Copied verbal
punishment
Verbalization on the adult doll’s behalf assigning at
least one of the same punishments as
demonstrated (withdrawal of sweets or television).
Novel verbal
punishment
Verbalization on the adult doll’s behalf assigning a
punishment not used in the demonstration (e.g.,
“Now you have to go home and go to bed”).
Violent punishment Using the adult doll to knock over the child doll.
punishment target when retelling inconsistent punishment stories.
This was confirmed by a 2 (condition: consistent vs. inconsistent
demonstrated punishment)× 2 (participant target choice: same
as demonstrated vs. different) mixed-design ANOVA modeling
the proportion of trials in which participants punished, which
revealed a significant interaction effect only, F(1, 93)= 12.77,
p= 0.001, η2= 0.08. The exact same pattern held when admon-
ishment rather than punishment was modeled, interaction F(1,
93)= 6.30, p= 0.014, η2= 0.04.
Participants caused the adult doll to punish or admonish in 36%
of trials, and 50% of participants enacted punishment or admon-
ishment at least once, with 44% targeting the perpetrator at least
FIGURE 2 | Participants’ punishment and admonishment of the
perpetrator and victim dolls following consistent and inconsistent
punishment demonstrations. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals
of the individual means.
Table 2 | Mean percentage of trials in which participants caused the adult doll to perform certain actions.
Participant’s actions Consistent demonstration
(perpetrator punished)
Inconsistent demonstration
(victim punished)
Participant targets: Participant targets:
Perpetrator Victim Neither Perpetrator Victim Neither
PRIMARY CATEGORIES
No action 0 0 41 0 0 48
Unclear or irrelevant action 8 8 8 5 9 2
Prosocial 0 3 0 0 5 0
Punish or admonish 34 0 2 22 14 2
SUBCATEGORIES FOR PUNISHMENT AND ADMONISHMENT
Admonishment 16 0 0 12 8 2
Punishment (all types) 20 0 2 16 6 0
Novel verbal punishment 6 0 0 5 3 0
Copied verbal punishment 11 0 2 12 3 0
Violent punishment 8 0 0 3 2 0
Participants targeted each child doll in turn in 5% of trials and targeted a child doll with more than one category of behavior in 7% of trials. This is why percentages
for the primary categories sum to 104 and 107% for the consistent and inconsistent conditions, respectively, and also why totals for subcategories sum to more than
parent category values.
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once, and 22% the victim. The proportion of trials containing
punishment or admonishment did not differ between conditions,
paired t (31)= 0.37, p= 0.712, d = 0.07 (Table 2). The proportion
of trials in which participants performed no action was greater
following inconsistent than consistent demonstrated punishment,
paired t (31)= 2.4, p= 0.023, d = 0.42 (Table 2).
Participants made a choice of adult doll on 93% of trials.
Of the choices made, 37% were for the punisher in consistent
punishment trials and 40% were for the punisher in inconsistent
punishment trials. The only pattern was therefore a general ten-
dency for participants to avoid choosing the punisher: pooling the
two conditions, the mean proportion of trials with a choice made
in which the participant chose the punisher was significantly less
than 0.5, t (31)= 2.15, p= 0.039, d = 0.38. A variety of exploratory
analyses revealed no further effects on doll choice. For example, it
was not affected by position in trial sequence.
After seven participants had been tested, the experimenters
had a strong subjective impression that participants were choos-
ing adult dolls based on appearance, because for example they
answered “the red one” when asked to choose. At this point, the
procedure was modified so that the questioner asked “Why did
you choose that one?” after the participant had made a choice.
Four of the next nine participants gave at least one answer con-
sistent with a choice based on appearance, for example “because
it’s red.” The procedure was then modified so that each pair of
adult dolls was identical in appearance. Nevertheless, two of the
next five participants gave at least one answer consistent with
a choice based on appearance, for example “because it’s fatter”
(the doll’s clothes had billowed out). At this point the extra ques-
tion was abandoned as it had served its purpose and potentially
placed additional demands on the participants. The change in doll
appearance was made half-way through testing and was therefore
counterbalanced with other variables. The presence of the ques-
tion was approximately although not perfectly counterbalanced
but had no detectable effect on other measured variables.
Finally the effects of participants’ doll choices on their subse-
quent actions when retelling the story were examined. When the
perpetrator was punished in the demonstration (consistent trials),
participants punished or admonished in 53% of trials in which
they chose the punisher, but 30% of trials in which they chose
the non-punishing adult doll. When the victim was punished in
the demonstration (inconsistent trials), participants punished or
admonished in 37% of trials in which they chose the punisher
adult doll, but 43% of trials in which they chose the non-punishing
adult. It therefore appeared that the tendency to punish or admon-
ish after having chosen the punisher doll was greater when the
demonstrated punishment was consistent. This was confirmed sta-
tistically by a significant interaction between condition (consistent
vs. inconsistent) and participant’s choice of doll (punisher vs. non-
punishing adult), F(1, 47)= 7.28, p= 0.010, η2= 0.03, in a 2× 2
mixed-design ANOVA modeling the proportion of trials contain-
ing punishment or admonishment in the retelling, including the
aforementioned interaction and corresponding main effects.
DISCUSSION
The demonstration of a doll story in which the victim rather than
the perpetrator of an antisocial act was punished (inconsistent
punishment) caused some 4-year-olds to likewise enact punish-
ment or admonishment for the victim when retelling the story.
However, the trends after demonstrations of both consistent and
inconsistent punishment were for participants to enact punish-
ment for the perpetrator. This was because participants were more
likely to change the story following an inconsistent punishment
demonstration, so that the perpetrator rather than the victim was
punished. Four-year-olds’ choices of targets for punishment or
admonishment were therefore influenced weakly by the demon-
stration and strongly by a tendency to enact punishment for the
perpetrator rather than the victim.
MOTIVATION FOR THE IMITATION OF INCONSISTENT PUNISHMENT
That some children should be caused by a demonstration to pun-
ish or admonish an innocent doll is no surprise. This result is
to some extent a replication of classic studies demonstrating that
preschoolers imitate both the general display of aggression and
specific aggressive acts when adults display aggressive behavior
toward dolls (Bandura et al., 1961; Bandura, 1965). A wealth of
more recent studies demonstrate that preschoolers, older children,
and even adults readily and faithfully imitate a range of different
types of actions that don’t appear to make sense (McGuigan et al.,
2011; Nielsen and Blank, 2011; Over and Carpenter, 2012). Chil-
dren internalize adults’ strange actions as normative despite the
absence of any explanation and although they are confused as to
the actions’ purposes (Kenward et al., 2011; Kenward, 2012). The
current results provide more evidence of young children’s faithful
imitation, not only in that the demonstrated choice of punishment
target was sometimes copied, but also in that most punishment
actions enacted by participants included a verbal punishment
copied directly from the demonstration.
MOTIVATION FOR THE PUNISHMENT OF A MORAL NORM VIOLATOR
Against the background of these imitation results, the finding that
participants usually changed the target when the demonstrated
punishment was inconsistent is striking. It indicates that the ten-
dency to prefer punishing antisocial rather than non-antisocial
individuals is very strong in 4-year-olds, because it usually over-
came the tendency to faithfully imitate, which is itself strong. This
result is in line with findings showing that young children believe
moral rules are to some extent authority independent (for exam-
ple, they view hitting as wrong even in a hypothetical scenario
in which an adult has condoned it, Smetana, 1985, 2006; Tisak
and Turiel, 1988), but goes beyond these findings in showing that
preschoolers also tend not to be guided by the morally inconsistent
actions of a real and present adult.
This result is also consistent with previous studies in which
preschoolers were asked to make recommendations concerning
punishment in situations involving norm violations. From the age
of 3 years children tend to answer yes when asked if norm violators
should “get into trouble,” with moral norm violations regarded as
more deserving of punishment than other social rules (Smetana,
1981, 2006; Smetana et al., 1993; Stern and Peterson, 1999). Here,
however, children actually enacted punishment, albeit within the
confines of a pretend doll world. Young children are aware of
the pretend/reality distinction, but they generalize the workings
of the real world to pretend worlds (Lillard, 2001). Importantly,
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children’s actions with dolls represent their real concerns and
wishes, which is why doll stories are useful in research and clinical
settings (Murray, 2007). The observed choices regarding punish-
ment are therefore likely to reflect real behavioral tendencies. This
study therefore represents an advance on previous studies in which
children have only given opinions about what ought to happen,
rather than acting themselves.
Although the participants’ choices of targets for punishment
and admonishment were not usually influenced by the experi-
menters’ inconsistent punishment choices, it is likely that their
target choices were influenced by their previous experiences of
adult behavior. The specific styles of their punishment were clearly
under such influence as they frequently involved behaviors which
were not present in the demonstration but which had presumably
been previously witnessed, such as instructions to go to bed early.
Admonishment, which was never modeled, was almost as frequent
as punishment. Also because the children were asked to play the
role of an adult, it is therefore possible that their punishment and
admonishment behavior was motivated primarily by a tendency
to conform to the perceived desires of authority figures by emu-
lating normal adult behavior (Damon, 1980; Kohlberg et al., 1983;
Grusec and Kuczynski, 1997). A different possibility is that the
participants were motivated (as adults are, Carlsmith and Darley,
2008; Keller et al., 2010) by an intrinsic desire to see punish-
ment done to an individual who deserves it because the individual
performed an antisocial act.
There are a number of reasons to believe that such an intrin-
sic deserts-based sentiment is at least partially responsible for
motivating the participants’ punishment enactments. Firstly, if
adult authority was solely responsible for determining partici-
pant behavior, one would expect currently present adults to have
a stronger effect than they did (Nielsen and Blank, 2011). Sec-
ondly, even young preschoolers’ attitudes toward moral transgres-
sions are (as previously discussed) to some extent independent of
authority figures (Smetana, 1985, 2006; Tisak and Turiel, 1988).
Thirdly, young preschoolers do have a sense of fairness, at least
when it comes to what individuals deserve when resources rather
than punishments are being allocated (Gummerum et al., 2010;
Kenward and Dahl, 2011; LoBue et al., 2011). Together these find-
ings indicate that the punitive behavior demonstrated here in some
4-year-olds is likely to build on an intrinsic desire for negative
outcomes for those who have violated moral norms.
A second question concerns the origin of this punitive senti-
ment. The crucial role of internalization of cultural norms in the
development of moral sentiment is clear (Thompson et al., 2006),
but it is also possible that such attitudes may be to some extent bio-
logically inherited. In non-verbal paradigms, even younger chil-
dren than studied here demonstrate what appear to be the begin-
nings of punitive sentiments. Before their second birthday children
prefer to cause a negative outcome to an antisocial individual,
and 8-month-olds are attracted to an individual who hindered an
individual that was antisocial (Hamlin et al., 2011). Given also
observations that even infants have some expectations of fairness
(Geraci and Surian, 2011; Schmidt and Sommerville, 2011; Sloane
et al., 2012), the strong arguments that some aspects of moral
behavior are biologically inherited (de Waal, 2008; Warneken and
Tomasello, 2009), and the observation of continuity in social
cognition from infancy to the preschool years in the context of
antisocial behavior (Yamaguchi et al., 2009), it appears plausible
that the development of punitive sentiment is partially determined
by biological inheritance, but further work will be necessary to
resolve this issue.
The finding that preschoolers modify a story which does not fit
their normative conceptions parallels research carried out on the
development of gender stereotypes. In such studies (e.g.,Koblinsky
et al., 1978; Welch-Ross and Schmidt, 1996) participants are told
stories concerning children engaging in activities which are consis-
tent or inconsistent with gender stereotypes. Participants’ memory
for such stories after a delay is worse for stereotype inconsistent
stories because, for example, they sometimes remember that a boy
was playing with a truck when in the original story a girl had
been doing so. The current study indicates that normative biases
influence not only memory of behavior but also its re-enactment.
However, because the current study did not include a delay and
because inconsistent punishment is more unusual and salient than
gender-stereotype inconsistent activities, the current effect is less
likely to reflect a misremembering and more likely to reflect a
modification of a correctly remembered story.
ISSUES OF VALIDITY
It should be noted that the frequency of punishment or admon-
ishment was relatively low, with only slightly more than a third of
trials containing punishment or admonishment, and only half of
the participants ever enacting punishment or admonishment. This
presents a challenge to the generalizability of the results and means
that very universal conclusions should not be drawn on the basis of
this study. It may be that not all 4-year-olds are motivated to enact
punishment, even in a paradigm such as this which encourages it.
However, it is also possible that children who did not enact punish-
ment or admonishment may have avoided doing so for different
reasons than a lack of motivation to punish. They may have felt
uncomfortable in the situation and the demonstration of inconsis-
tent punishment may have contributed to this. These possibilities
are consistent with the observations that in many trials children
took no action with the adult doll whatsoever, even apart from
punishment or admonishment, and that this was more frequent
following demonstration of inconsistent punishment.
LACK OF EVIDENCE FOR IDENTIFICATION WITH PUNISHERS OF MORAL
NORM VIOLATORS
Our secondary hypothesis, that children would identify with a
punishing agent when the punishment was consistent, and there-
fore choose to play the role of that agent when given the oppor-
tunity, was not supported. There was an overall weak tendency
to choose the non-punishing adult, irrespective of whether the
punishment was consistent. Many participants claimed to choose
on the basis of doll appearance, and given the lack of an effect
of condition on doll choice this suggests that dolls’ appearances
were more important than dolls’ prior actions for determining
which doll participants wanted to be. This makes sense when
one considers that participants knew that they could choose new
actions for the doll they selected but that they could not change
its appearance. The lack of difference between the conditions and
the readiness of the children to enact punishment indicate that
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the punisher was probably not avoided specifically because it pun-
ished. At the moment of choice, the punisher doll stood facing the
targeted child doll, whereas the non-punishing adult doll faced
the participant. This was intended to aid participants’ memory
as to the dolls’ actions in the story, but given the participants’
unexpected responsiveness to doll appearance may have acted as a
confounding factor.
Despite the lack of evidence that participants considered the
actions of the adult dolls when choosing between them, doll
choice did impact their subsequent actions with the doll. Par-
ticipants were more likely to enact punishment or admonishment
after choosing the punisher doll when the demonstrated punish-
ment had been consistent than when it had been inconsistent.
The simplest explanation for this result is that when retelling a
story children have a tendency to cause a doll to perform the same
actions as it previously performed, but that this tendency is dimin-
ished when the actions are incompatible with the children’s own
preferences.
CONCLUSION
The verbal nature of many of the punishment expressions showed
that the children had a conceptual grasp of the appropriateness
of the punishments they enacted. Children preferred to enact
punishment toward those who had been antisocial, and this
punishment was likely to have been at least partially motivated
by a deserts-based sentiment that antisocial actions deserve to
be punished. This is important because it suggests that the ret-
ributive tendencies which drive adult punishment (Carlsmith and
Darley, 2008; Keller et al., 2010) are developing from an early age.
It remains unclear, however, to what extent preschoolers would
spontaneously punish if punishment had not been primed by a
demonstration, or if a harmful action had not been required by
the experimenter as in Hamlin et al.s’ (2011) study. There are still
a very small number of published studies in which children have
themselves had the opportunity to cause a negative outcome for
other individuals who have behaved antisocially toward third par-
ties (we are only aware of Hamlin et al., 2011). There is also still
no study of which we aware in which young children have been
given the impression they can allocate punishment to real people.
If the associated ethical problems can be solved, such a study is
the required next step in the investigation of the development of
punitive sentiment.
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APPENDIX
PROCEDURE SCRIPT, TRANSLATED FROM SWEDISH
Two experimenters carried out the procedure, one of whom always controlled the punisher adult doll (P) and one of whom put all ques-
tions to the participant (Q). The experimenter who controlled the perpetrator child doll (E1) and the experimenter who controlled the
victim (E2) were varied over the four trials as AABB or BBAA. The order of inconsistent and consistent trials was varied as ABAB, BABA,
ABBA, or BAAB, counterbalanced against the previous variable. The four different story scenarios were always told in the following order.
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Demonstration phase
E1: This is [perpetrator child doll’s name, henceforth Perp]. He/she is four. Takes out perpetrator child doll.
E2: And this is [victim child doll’s name, henceforth Vic]. He/she is four. Takes out victim child doll.
E1: [Perp] and [Vic] were out playing one day.
E2: [Vic] said, “shall we play
football?”
E2: [Vic] said, “shall we play
hide-and-seek?”
E2: [Vic] said, “shall we roll
like sausages?”
E2: [Vic] said, “shall we do
hand-stands?”
E1: “Yes let’s do that!”
The child dolls are made to
play football with a small ball,
borrowed from the participant.
E2: But then they got tired of
football.
E1: And then [Perp] said,
“you’re stupid. I’m going to
hit you!” Causes Perp to knock
over Vic.
E2: [Vic] closed her eyes and
started counting so [Perp]
could hide.
E1: But instead [Perp] said,
“you’re stupid. I’m going to
hit you!” Causes Perp to knock
over Vic.
E2: They lay on the ground
and started rolling around.
The child dolls are caused to do
so.
E1: But then [Perp] jumped
up and said, “you’re stupid.
I’m going to stamp on you!”
Causes Perp to stamp on Vic,
who stays down.
E2: [Vic] did a hand-stand.
Causes Vic to do so.
E1: But [Perp] said “you’re
stupid. I’m going to kick you
in the head!” Causes Perp to
kick Vic, knocking Vic over.
E2: And she/he hit/stamped on/kicked [Vic], even though [Vic] hadn’t done anything. “Ouch,” said [Vic].
Q: There was a grown-up who had seen everything. Takes out non-punishing adult doll.
P: There was another grown-up who had also seen everything. Takes out punisher adult doll.
Q: The first grown-up didn’t say anything.
P: Positions adult doll facing Perp (consistent)/Vic (inconsistent). But the other grown-up said to [Perp/Vic],
“Why are you fighting, [Perp/Vic]? Now you won’t get any sweeties. And you won’t get to watch TV either.”
Choice phase
Q: And that was the end of the story. [Participant’s name], if you got to be one of the grown-ups, which one
would you be? Points at both adult dolls simultaneously.
Further details of the choice procedure including further prompting are found in the method.
Retelling phase
Q: Now we are going to tell the story again, and [P’s name] and I will be the children again, but [participant’s
name], now you get to be the grown-up and decide what the grown-up does. It could be the same as before, or it
could be something new. You decide.
E2: [Perp] and [Vic] were out
playing football (the child dolls
are briefly caused to do so), but
then they got tired of it.
E1: And then [Perp] said,
“you’re stupid. I’m going to
hit you!” Causes Perp to knock
over Vic.
E2: [Perp] and [Vic] were out
playing hide-and-seek. [Vic]
closed her eyes and started
counting so [Perp] could hide.
E1: But instead [Perp] said,
“you’re stupid. I’m going to
hit you!” Causes Perp to knock
over Vic.
E2: [Perp] and [Vic] were out
rolling like sausages. The child
dolls are caused to do so.
E1: But then [Perp] jumped
up and said, “you’re stupid.
I’m going to stamp on you!”
Causes Perp to stamp on Vic.
E2: [Perp] and [Vic] were
outdoing hand-stands. Causes
Vic to do so.
E1: But [Perp] said “you’re
stupid. I’m going to kick you
in the head!” Causes Perp to
kick Vic, knocking Vic over.
E2: And she/he hit/stamped on/kicked [Vic], even though [Vic] hadn’t done anything. “Ouch,” said [Vic].
Q: And what does the grown-up do now?
Further details of the retelling procedure including further prompting are found in the method.
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